I denne artikel på warontherocks.com forklarer David Auerswald, hvorfor den amerikanske flåde ikke bør gennemføre “Freedom of Navigation Operations” i gennem The Northern Sea Route, som det ellers er den proklamerede hensigt ifølge flere ministre i den amerikanske regering.
The long-run implications are dire should a FONOP fail, even if it did not lead to a military confrontation. Failure would build perceptions that the United States can’t compete in the Arctic and that Russia can get away with violating freedom of navigation when challenged. Such failure could have ripple effects for NATO’s posture in the High North, and for future Russian behavior.
Rusland har store strategiske og økonomiske interesser i den arktiske region, hvilket forventeligt betyder, at russerne vil fastholde deres opfattelse af at have legitime krav på at kunne kontrollere søruten langs Ruslands nordkyst. Samtidig er der risiko for , at FONOPs i den russiske del af Arktis vil skabe bekymring i Canada om, hvorvidt USA aktivt vil modsætte sig Canadas fastholdelse af, at søruten gennem den canadiske del af Arktis er nationalt farvand.
Auerswald argumenterer for, at USA i stedet bør tænke langsigtet og gennemføre planerne om at bygge isbrydere. Ikke for at kunne gennemføre FONOPs, men for at kunne operere i egen del af Arktis og til støtte for NATO allierede.
Finally, the United States needs to rethink Arctic maritime operations writ large. It should build icebreakers and ice-capable surface ships, not for Arctic FONOPs but to support search and rescue operations in and maritime control of Alaskan waters. Those capabilities could also address American defense responsibilities toward NATO allies Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway. Until then, the United States should be very, very cautious about saber-rattling in the Russian Arctic, and do so only after thinking through the long-term implications of failure and success.
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